DHC-2 / DHC-3 Floatplane Midair Collision

Two Ketchikan sightseeing floatplanes collide over George Inlet, Alaska May 13, 2019, 12:21 ADT · over George Inlet, about 8 miles northeast of Ketchikan, Alaska
Accident
Midair collision
6 fatal / 16 aboard
9 serious, 1 minor — 10 survivors
Investigation status
Final report published
NTSB · Final report (AAR-21/04) adopted April 20, 2021

Case summary

Neither pilot saw the other aircraft in time, and one airplane's onboard traffic-alert system had been switched off that day.

The accident DHC-2 Beaver, N952DB, in Mountain Air Service livery, photographed before the accident
de Havilland DHC-2 Beaver
Mountain Air Service LLC
The accident DHC-2, N952DB, photographed before the accident
Key facts
Aircraft
de Havilland DHC-2 Beaver (A1) & de Havilland DHC-3 Otter (A2)
Registration
N952DB (A1) · N959PA (A2)
Location
Ketchikan, AlaskaOver George Inlet, ~8 mi NE of Ketchikan
Flights
Both aircraft: Misty Fjords sightseeing loop → Ketchikan Harbor Seaplane Base (5KE)Converging on the same waterfall near Mahoney Lakes, Revillagigedo Island
Phase of flight
En route cruise, VFR sightseeingMidair collision at 3,350 ft msl
Operation
Part 135 on-demand sightseeing, both aircraft
Occupants
16
Fatalities
6
Serious injuries
9
Minor injuries
1
Damage
DHC-2 destroyed · DHC-3 substantial damage
Weather
Clear, 10+ mi visibilityVMC prevailed; light wind out of the southeast

What happened

Source: NTSB Final Report (excerpt)

At 1217:15, the DHC-3 was about level at 4,000 ft on a track of 225°. About this time, the pilot checked his cockpit traffic display and noted "there were two groups of blue triangles, but not on my line" — he did not check it again before the collision. The DHC-2 was 4.2 nautical miles south, climbing through 2,800 ft, on a track of 255°. About 1219, the DHC-3 started a descent from 4,000 ft while the DHC-2 continued climbing; over the next 1 minute 21 seconds the DHC-3 descended on a track between 224° and 237°, and the DHC-2 leveled out at 3,350 ft on a track of about 255°. The airplanes collided at 1221:14 at an altitude of 3,350 ft, 7.4 nautical miles northeast of the Ketchikan Harbor Seaplane Base. The DHC-2 was fractured into multiple pieces and came down in water and terrain northeast of Mahoney Lake. The DHC-3 entered a right bank, reaching about 50° right wing down within 5 seconds of the collision, then completed a 180° turn before going down in George Inlet.

Why it happened

Source: NTSB Final Report
NTSB probable causeNTSB

"The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid concept, which prevented the two pilots from seeing the other airplane before the collision, and the absence of visual and aural alerts from both airplanes' traffic display systems, while operating in a geographic area with a high concentration of air tour activity. Contributing to the accident were (1) the Federal Aviation Administration's provision of new transceivers that lacked alerting capability to Capstone Program operators without adequately mitigating the increased risk associated with the consequent loss of the previously available alerting capability and (2) the absence of a requirement for airborne traffic advisory systems with aural alerting among operators who carry passengers for hire."

Contributing factors
  • Inherent limitations of the see-and-avoid concept — neither pilot had a realistic opportunity to visually acquire the other airplane before the collision
  • Absence of visual and aural alerts from both airplanes' cockpit traffic display systems while operating in a high-traffic air tour area
  • FAA's post-Capstone-program transceiver upgrade removed the DHC-3's previously available aural alerting capability without adequately mitigating the resulting risk
  • No regulatory requirement for airborne traffic advisory systems with aural alerting among Part 135 operators carrying passengers for hire
  • The DHC-3's Garmin GSL 71 control head was found in the OFF position, cutting off the pressure-altitude data the DHC-2's traffic-alerting system needed to generate an alert
  • An inadequate checklist in the DHC-3 (inherited from a prior operator) that never required verifying the GSL 71 was ON before takeoff
  • No requirement for a safety management system (SMS) at Part 135 operators, which NTSB found could have surfaced this alerting gap before the accident
Safety takeaways
"See-and-avoid" has real, measurable limits — NTSB's own analysis showed the DHC-3 pilot had essentially no opportunity to visually detect the DHC-2, which stayed behind a window post, showed little apparent motion, and blended into a complex terrain background for most of the final three minutes before impact.
In busy sightseeing or air-tour airspace, don't assume a glance at a traffic display substitutes for a continuous scan — the DHC-3 pilot checked his display once, about four minutes before the collision, and never again.
A cockpit traffic system is only as good as its weakest link: an equipment upgrade, a mis-set control head, or a missing checklist item can silently disable alerting on an airplane that looks, to the pilot, like it's working normally.
If your aircraft's avionics were modified or upgraded, verify — don't assume — that safety capabilities you relied on before (like aural alerts) survived the change; ask specifically what the new equipment does and doesn't do.
A preflight checklist inherited from a previous operator or owner can be missing exactly the item that matters for your airplane's current equipment — review it against what's actually installed, not just what's printed.
Aircraft
de Havilland DHC-2 Beaver (A1) & de Havilland DHC-3 Otter (A2)
Registration
N952DB (A1) · N959PA (A2)
Location
Ketchikan, AlaskaOver George Inlet, ~8 mi NE of Ketchikan
Flights
Both aircraft: Misty Fjords sightseeing loop → Ketchikan Harbor Seaplane Base (5KE)Converging on the same waterfall near Mahoney Lakes, Revillagigedo Island
Phase of flight
En route cruise, VFR sightseeingMidair collision at 3,350 ft msl
Operation
Part 135 on-demand sightseeing, both aircraft
Occupants
16
Fatalities
6
Serious injuries
9
Minor injuries
1
Damage
DHC-2 destroyed · DHC-3 substantial damage
Weather
Clear, 10+ mi visibilityVMC prevailed; light wind out of the southeast
"See-and-avoid" has real, measurable limits — NTSB's own analysis showed the DHC-3 pilot had essentially no opportunity to visually detect the DHC-2, which stayed behind a window post, showed little apparent motion, and blended into a complex terrain background for most of the final three minutes before impact.
In busy sightseeing or air-tour airspace, don't assume a glance at a traffic display substitutes for a continuous scan — the DHC-3 pilot checked his display once, about four minutes before the collision, and never again.
A cockpit traffic system is only as good as its weakest link: an equipment upgrade, a mis-set control head, or a missing checklist item can silently disable alerting on an airplane that looks, to the pilot, like it's working normally.
If your aircraft's avionics were modified or upgraded, verify — don't assume — that safety capabilities you relied on before (like aural alerts) survived the change; ask specifically what the new equipment does and doesn't do.
A preflight checklist inherited from a previous operator or owner can be missing exactly the item that matters for your airplane's current equipment — review it against what's actually installed, not just what's printed.
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