Boeing B-17G / Bell P-63F Midair Collision

Two Commemorative Air Force warbirds collided in flight at the Wings Over Dallas air show, Dallas, Texas November 12, 2022, afternoon · Wings Over Dallas air show, Dallas Executive Airport (KRBD), Dallas, Texas
Accident
Mid-air collision
6 fatal / 6 aboard
No survivors, both aircraft
Investigation status
Final report published
NTSB · Final report (AIR-24-07) dated December 4, 2024

Case summary

The air boss and organizers never prebriefed a separation plan for the two aircraft, relying only on real-time radio calls to keep them apart.

The accident airplane, Commemorative Air Force Boeing B-17G “Texas Raiders,” N7227C, photographed before the accident
Boeing B-17G Flying Fortress
Commemorative Air Force, “Texas Raiders”
The accident airplane, photographed before the accident
Key facts
Aircraft
Boeing B-17G Flying Fortress (A1) & Bell P-63F Kingcobra (A2)
Registration
N7227C (A1) · N6763 (A2)
Location
Dallas Executive Airport (KRBD), Dallas, TXDebris field south of the runway 31 approach end, within airport property
Performance
Wings Over Dallas air show, “Warbirds” segment (7th performance of the day)B-17G leading 5 bombers in trail; P-63F trailing a 3-ship fighter formation
Phase of flight
Air show flying display — repositioning for a scheduled passMid-air collision
Operation
Part 91 air show performance, FAA certificate of waiver (both aircraft)
Occupants
6
Fatalities
6
Serious injuries
0
Minor injuries
0
Damage
Both aircraft destroyed
Weather
VMC, clearWeather was not a factor

What happened

Source: NTSB Final Report (excerpt)

As the bomber group and fighter formation repositioned for the next scheduled pass in front of the crowd, the air boss directed the fighter formation to pass the bomber group on their left side and cross in front of the Boeing B-17G to reach the 500-ft show line. The fighter lead and the second fighter misread the directive and leveled off early, at the 1,000-ft line instead — but the Bell P-63F, trailing the formation, kept closing on a flight path that converged with the B-17G. In a descending, left-banked turn, the P-63F struck the B-17G's left side near the trailing edge of the wing. Both airplanes broke apart in flight and crashed; there were no survivors among the six people aboard the two airplanes.

Why it happened

Source: NTSB Final Report
NTSB probable causeNTSB

"The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was the air boss's and air show event organizer's lack of an adequate, prebriefed aircraft separation plan for the air show performance, relying instead on the air boss's real-time deconfliction directives and the see-and-avoid strategy for collision avoidance, which allowed for the loss of separation between the Boeing B-17G and the Bell P-63F airplanes. Also causal was the diminished ability of the accident pilots to see and avoid the other aircraft due to flight path geometry, out-the-window view obscuration by aircraft structures, attention demands associated with the air show performance, and the inherent limitations of human performance that can make it difficult to see another aircraft. Contributing to the accident were the lack of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) guidance for air bosses and air show event organizers on developing plans and performing risk assessments that ensure the separation of aircraft that are not part of an approved maneuvers package and the lack of FAA requirements and guidance for recurrent evaluations of air bosses and direct surveillance of their performance."

Contributing factors
  • Lack of a prebriefed, administratively controlled aircraft separation plan for the performance — the air boss relied on improvised, real-time deconfliction instead
  • Ambiguous air boss radio directives about which “show line” to fly, which led the fighter lead pilot to level off at the wrong line
  • Inherent limits of see-and-avoid: flight path geometry, aircraft structure obscuring each pilot's view of the other airplane, and the high attention demands of flying the performance
  • FAA and International Council of Air Shows (ICAS) guidance that did not adequately address deconfliction risk for air boss–directed performances involving multiple, dissimilar aircraft
  • No FAA requirement for recurrent evaluation of air bosses, and no direct FAA surveillance of an air boss's live performance
  • No documented, performance-specific safety risk assessment process to identify and mitigate the hazard before the show
  • Commemorative Air Force's lack of a strong, clearly defined safety risk assessment plan, leaving air show production decisions susceptible to pressures unrelated to safety
  • Elevated real-time workload on the air boss, who was simultaneously sequencing the performance, coordinating a revenue passenger ride, and coordinating a taxiing B-29
Safety takeaways
A verbal, real-time “I'll keep them apart” plan is not a separation plan — multi-aircraft, dissimilar-type air show performances need a written, prebriefed plan with defined lateral, altitude, and timing deconfliction before anyone takes off.
See-and-avoid has real physical limits — aircraft structure blocking the view, converging-flightpath geometry, and the sheer workload of flying a show can defeat a pilot's ability to see another aircraft in time, even when everyone involved is doing their job as briefed.
An air boss makes air-traffic-control-grade, real-time separation calls without any of the recurrent evaluation, standardized phraseology, or direct oversight that actual air traffic controllers are required to have.
Ambiguous radio phraseology is itself a hazard — a directive that two pilots can reasonably interpret two different ways (which show line to fly) is a latent failure waiting for the wrong moment to matter.
An organization's safety culture has to make it normal, not just permitted, for performers to report a near-miss — a program can't fix a deconfliction problem it never hears about.

Photos & media (2)

Pre-accident reference photos of both aircraft, and an NTSB flight-path diagram (not photographs of the collision)
Aircraft
Boeing B-17G Flying Fortress (A1) & Bell P-63F Kingcobra (A2)
Registration
N7227C (A1) · N6763 (A2)
Location
Dallas Executive Airport (KRBD), Dallas, TXDebris field south of the runway 31 approach end, within airport property
Performance
Wings Over Dallas air show, “Warbirds” segment (7th performance of the day)B-17G leading 5 bombers in trail; P-63F trailing a 3-ship fighter formation
Phase of flight
Air show flying display — repositioning for a scheduled passMid-air collision
Operation
Part 91 air show performance, FAA certificate of waiver (both aircraft)
Occupants
6
Fatalities
6
Serious injuries
0
Minor injuries
0
Damage
Both aircraft destroyed
Weather
VMC, clearWeather was not a factor
A verbal, real-time “I'll keep them apart” plan is not a separation plan — multi-aircraft, dissimilar-type air show performances need a written, prebriefed plan with defined lateral, altitude, and timing deconfliction before anyone takes off.
See-and-avoid has real physical limits — aircraft structure blocking the view, converging-flightpath geometry, and the sheer workload of flying a show can defeat a pilot's ability to see another aircraft in time, even when everyone involved is doing their job as briefed.
An air boss makes air-traffic-control-grade, real-time separation calls without any of the recurrent evaluation, standardized phraseology, or direct oversight that actual air traffic controllers are required to have.
Ambiguous radio phraseology is itself a hazard — a directive that two pilots can reasonably interpret two different ways (which show line to fly) is a latent failure waiting for the wrong moment to matter.
An organization's safety culture has to make it normal, not just permitted, for performers to report a near-miss — a program can't fix a deconfliction problem it never hears about.
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