Mutiny Bay Floatplane Crash — de Havilland DHC-3 Otter (N725TH)

Loss of pitch control and water impact that killed all 10 aboard near Whidbey Island, Washington September 4, 2022, 15:09 PDT · Mutiny Bay, near Freeland, WA
Accident
Serious outcome
10 fatal / 10 aboard
No survivors
Investigation status
Final report published
NTSB · Final report (AIR-23-01) adopted September 29, 2023

Case summary

A missing lock ring let a critical clamp nut unscrew in flight, letting the tail surface move uncommanded to an extreme nose-down trim.

The accident airplane, N725TH, a float-equipped de Havilland DHC-3 Otter in Northwest Seaplanes livery, photographed before the accident at Renton, Washington
de Havilland DHC-3 Otter (float-equipped)
Single-engine turboprop floatplane
N725TH, photographed before the accident, parked on its floats at Renton
Key facts
Aircraft
de Havilland DHC-3 Otter (float-equipped)
Registration
N725TH
Location
Mutiny Bay, WashingtonNear Freeland, Whidbey Island (Puget Sound)
Route
Friday Harbor Seaplane Base (W33) → Renton Seaplane Base (W36)Scheduled Part 135 passenger flight; 5th leg of the day's second round trip
Phase of flight
En route cruise, abrupt pitch-downLoss of pitch control → near-vertical descent to water impact
Operation
Scheduled commuter/air taxi (Part 135)
Occupants
10
Fatalities
10
Serious injuries
0
Minor injuries
0
Damage
Destroyed
Weather
VMC, 10 mi visibilityFew clouds 4,000 ft; AIRMET Tango for moderate turbulence below 12,000 ft

What happened

Source: NTSB Final Report (excerpt)

According to ADS-B data, the en route altitude was between 600 and 1,000 ft above mean sea level, and the groundspeed was between 115 and 135 knots. At 1508:40, the altitude was 1,000 ft msl, and the groundspeed had decreased to 111 knots. Based on performance calculations, at 1508:43, the airplane pitched up about 8° and then abruptly pitched down about 58°. The data ended at 1508:51, when the airplane’s altitude was 600 ft msl and the estimated descent rate was more than 9,500 ft per minute. Witnesses near the accident site reported, and security camera video confirmed, the airplane was in level flight before it entered a slight climb and then pitched down. One witness described the descent as “near vertical” and estimated the airplane was in an 85° nose-down attitude before impact with the water. Several witnesses described the airplane as “spinning,” “rotating,” or “spiraling” during portions of the steep descent. The airplane continued in a nose-low, near-vertical descent until it impacted water in Mutiny Bay.

Why it happened

Source: NTSB Final Report
NTSB probable causeNTSB

"The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was the in-flight unthreading of the clamp nut from the horizontal stabilizer trim actuator barrel due to a missing lock ring, which resulted in the horizontal stabilizer moving to an extreme trailing-edge-down position rendering the airplane’s pitch uncontrollable."

Contributing factors
  • A missing lock ring allowed the horizontal stabilizer trim actuator's clamp nut to unscrew from its barrel in flight
  • No secondary (redundant) retention feature existed to back up the lock ring on the DHC-3 actuator design
  • An unapproved moisture seal, installed by maintenance personnel outside manufacturer guidance, increased rotational friction between the clamp nut and eye bolt and likely interfered with proper clamp-up of the assembly
  • Manufacturer maintenance documentation lacked clear torque, drilled-hole-count, and inspection criteria for the clamp nut and lock ring installation
Safety takeaways
A single missing fastener — here, one small wire lock ring — can be the entire difference between controlled flight and an unrecoverable pitch excursion; critical flight-control linkages need redundancy, not just correct assembly.
Maintenance modifications that fall outside the manufacturer's approved documentation, even well-intentioned ones like the moisture seal added here, can introduce failure modes nobody tested for.
When a flight-control linkage separates in cruise flight at low altitude, there may be no time to recover — this accident sequence ran from pitch-up to water impact in about 8 seconds.
Vague maintenance-manual language — no specified torque value, no limit on drilled holes, no defined inspection interval — is itself a safety gap, not an acceptable ambiguity for operators to interpret informally.
Urgent safety recommendations can arrive well before a final report: the NTSB pushed an immediate inspection directive to the FAA and Transport Canada about seven weeks into this investigation, based only on preliminary findings.
Aircraft
de Havilland DHC-3 Otter (float-equipped)
Registration
N725TH
Location
Mutiny Bay, WashingtonNear Freeland, Whidbey Island (Puget Sound)
Route
Friday Harbor Seaplane Base (W33) → Renton Seaplane Base (W36)Scheduled Part 135 passenger flight; 5th leg of the day's second round trip
Phase of flight
En route cruise, abrupt pitch-downLoss of pitch control → near-vertical descent to water impact
Operation
Scheduled commuter/air taxi (Part 135)
Occupants
10
Fatalities
10
Serious injuries
0
Minor injuries
0
Damage
Destroyed
Weather
VMC, 10 mi visibilityFew clouds 4,000 ft; AIRMET Tango for moderate turbulence below 12,000 ft
A single missing fastener — here, one small wire lock ring — can be the entire difference between controlled flight and an unrecoverable pitch excursion; critical flight-control linkages need redundancy, not just correct assembly.
Maintenance modifications that fall outside the manufacturer's approved documentation, even well-intentioned ones like the moisture seal added here, can introduce failure modes nobody tested for.
When a flight-control linkage separates in cruise flight at low altitude, there may be no time to recover — this accident sequence ran from pitch-up to water impact in about 8 seconds.
Vague maintenance-manual language — no specified torque value, no limit on drilled holes, no defined inspection interval — is itself a safety gap, not an acceptable ambiguity for operators to interpret informally.
Urgent safety recommendations can arrive well before a final report: the NTSB pushed an immediate inspection directive to the FAA and Transport Canada about seven weeks into this investigation, based only on preliminary findings.
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