Gulfstream G150 (N22ST)

Runway overrun after an unstabilized approach at Ridgeland-Claude Dean Airport, South Carolina May 5, 2021, 10:33 EDT · Ridgeland-Claude Dean Airport (3J1)
Accident
Serious outcome
0 injured / 5 aboard
No fatalities
Investigation status
Final report published
NTSB · Final report published August 15, 2023

Case summary

Cockpit recordings show the crew racing another jet to the airport, ignoring repeated 'sink rate' and 'pull up' warnings all the way to touchdown.

Representative Gulfstream G150, same model as the accident aircraft (file photo, not the accident airplane)
Gulfstream G150
Twin-engine light business jet
Representative Gulfstream G150 · not the accident aircraft
Key facts
Aircraft
Gulfstream G150
Registration
N22ST
Location
Ridgeland, South CarolinaRidgeland-Claude Dean Airport (3J1)
Route
New Smyrna Beach (EVB) → Ridgeland-Claude Dean (3J1)Part 91 executive/corporate flight, IFR
Phase of flight
Landing roll — runway overrunUnstabilized approach continued to touchdown; ground air brakes failed to deploy
Operation
Executive/corporate (Part 91)
Occupants
5
Fatalities
0
Serious injuries
0
Minor injuries
0
Damage
Substantial
Weather
VMC, 10 mi visibilityWind 230° at 10 kt gusting 15 kt; quartering tailwind on landing

What happened

Source: NTSB Final Report (excerpt)

At 1031:35, the CVR recorded the sound of the autopilot being disconnected. About 1 minute later, the SIC remarked, "should we s-turn this thing?" The PIC replied, "nah we got it." At 1032:28, the airplane was on final approach about 900 ft above ground level (agl) and about 1.5 nautical miles from the runway threshold. At that time, the SIC called out an airspeed of 170 knots. (The reference landing speed [Vref] was 121 knots). The PIC responded to add full flaps. About 10 seconds later, the airplane's electronic voice announced "sink rate" and the SIC stated, "we know it." At 1032:46, the SIC called out an airspeed of 150 knots, and the electronic voice stated, "sink rate, sink rate, sink rate, pull up."

Why it happened

Source: NTSB Final Report
NTSB probable causeNTSB

"The National Transportation Safety Board determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The flight crew's continuation of an unstable approach and the failure of the ground air brakes to deploy upon touchdown, both of which resulted in the runway overrun. Contributing was the crew's motivation and response to external pressures to complete the flight as quickly as possible to accommodate passenger wishes and the crew's decision to land with a quartering tailwind that exceeded the airplane's limitations."

Contributing factors
  • Flight crew's continuation of an unstable approach despite repeated "sink rate" and "pull up" warnings
  • External pressure to beat another inbound airplane to the airport, which the crew described as a "race"
  • Failure of the ground air brakes to deploy automatically upon touchdown
  • Landing with a quartering tailwind of about 10–15 knots, exceeding the airplane's 10-knot tailwind limitation
  • Touchdown about 1,000 ft down the 4,200-ft runway, leaving reduced distance to stop without full braking systems
Safety takeaways
Informal competition with another aircraft — even unspoken — has no place in the cockpit; treat any urge to "beat" another flight to the runway as a reason to slow down, not speed up.
A stabilized-approach gate (on-speed, on-profile, fully configured by 500 ft agl) should be a hard go/no-go checkpoint, not a target to drift past because the airplane still feels recoverable.
An aural "sink rate" or "pull up" warning is the airplane reporting that the approach has already failed — the correct response is an immediate go-around, not a verbal acknowledgment followed by continuing to land.
Crew authority gradients matter: the SIC twice raised concerns — suggesting s-turns, then echoing the sink-rate warning with "we know it" — and was overridden both times; a standing rule that either pilot can call a mandatory go-around removes that hesitation.
Know the airplane's tailwind limitation precisely and check it against real conditions, not a glance at the windsock — a quartering tailwind that looks landable from the cockpit can silently add hundreds of feet to the landing roll, a margin that matters even more when a braking system fails.
Aircraft
Gulfstream G150
Registration
N22ST
Location
Ridgeland, South CarolinaRidgeland-Claude Dean Airport (3J1)
Route
New Smyrna Beach (EVB) → Ridgeland-Claude Dean (3J1)Part 91 executive/corporate flight, IFR
Phase of flight
Landing roll — runway overrunUnstabilized approach continued to touchdown; ground air brakes failed to deploy
Operation
Executive/corporate (Part 91)
Occupants
5
Fatalities
0
Serious injuries
0
Minor injuries
0
Damage
Substantial
Weather
VMC, 10 mi visibilityWind 230° at 10 kt gusting 15 kt; quartering tailwind on landing
Informal competition with another aircraft — even unspoken — has no place in the cockpit; treat any urge to "beat" another flight to the runway as a reason to slow down, not speed up.
A stabilized-approach gate (on-speed, on-profile, fully configured by 500 ft agl) should be a hard go/no-go checkpoint, not a target to drift past because the airplane still feels recoverable.
An aural "sink rate" or "pull up" warning is the airplane reporting that the approach has already failed — the correct response is an immediate go-around, not a verbal acknowledgment followed by continuing to land.
Crew authority gradients matter: the SIC twice raised concerns — suggesting s-turns, then echoing the sink-rate warning with "we know it" — and was overridden both times; a standing rule that either pilot can call a mandatory go-around removes that hesitation.
Know the airplane's tailwind limitation precisely and check it against real conditions, not a glance at the windsock — a quartering tailwind that looks landable from the cockpit can silently add hundreds of feet to the landing roll, a margin that matters even more when a braking system fails.
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